








Descartes and the Individuation of Bodies: Abstract

Descartes has standardly been read as holding that bodies achieve actual physical individuality through motion. He seems to say as much in Principles of Philosophy II, §25: “By ‘one body’ or ‘one piece of matter’ I mean whatever is transferred at a given time”. I contend, however, that this interpretation is quite wrong. Such a view would lead to an utterly untenable—and un-Cartesian—position whereby nothing could ever move, but nothing could be at rest either. Having noted this, I then examine §25 and related texts in some detail, and I argue that, as a matter of fact, they do not support this interpretation anyway. My conclusion is that physical individuality, for Descartes, has nothing to do with motion. Parts of matter at rest must be just as truly corporeal individuals as those that are moving, for Descartes treats the former as being just as physically efficacious as the latter. I contend that Descartes was happy to regard any conceivable region of extension as an actual body, regardless of whether it should happen to be moving or not.






	Descartes regarded the corporeal world as an indefinitely extended three-dimensional expanse of matter. Although he certainly felt that this expanse was continuous in the sense that there were no regions left void, he did also believe that it was distinguished into a multiplicity of corporeal individuals. It is this differentiation into discrete bodies, each one with an identity of its own apart from the rest, that is my concern in the present article. What is it, for Descartes, that distinguishes one body from its neighbours, in such a way as to make it genuinely one body? 
	To clarify the issue that concerns me, I should distinguish it from three other questions which, although certainly related to this one, can nevertheless be separated from it. For anyone who might be interested, these other questions are amply addressed in the existing secondary literature in this general area: citations will follow shortly below. But those authors do also tend to agree that these various issues can be separated, even when they opt to handle them in parallel.
	First, there is some room to question precisely how Descartes understood the metaphysical status of an individual body, not least because he himself seemed to offer different and incompatible proposals in different parts of his works.​[1]​ Are the various individual bodies that collectively make up the world to be understood as so many bona fide substances in their own right? Or might they be more properly thought of as modes (as in Spinoza) or ‘modal beings’ (to borrow an expression from certain later Cartesians, such as Robert Desgabets and Pierre-Sylvain Regis), all collectively inhering together in one single indefinite material substance?​[2]​ Or, indeed, perhaps this plurality of bodies is merely phenomenal, something that our minds project onto the intrinsically undifferentiated screen of res extensa (as Thomas Lennon has particularly urged on Descartes’ behalf).​[3]​ But, notwithstanding any intrinsic interest that this question might be thought to have, it can be prised apart from the one that I intend to explore. For, regardless of what we think an individual body is, ontologically speaking, we can all agree that some sort of distinction ought to be drawn between different bodies. So what is the basis for that distinction? My concern is not with how the category ‘body’ is set apart from other ontological categories, but with how one body—whatever that might be—is set apart from other bodies.​[4]​ Even if (as I am inclined to suspect) these bodies should each turn out to be genuine substances, it is not their substantiality that interests me. Rather, I am coming at them from the perspective of their physical efficacy. I am seeking to isolate individuals of a kind that can feature in laws of nature and in mechanical explanations of physical phenomena. In short, I am concerned with the kind of bodies that a physicist will care about, rather than with the kind of substances (or modal beings, or phenomena, or whatever) that might be of interest to a metaphysician. Admittedly, even though the bodies themselves might belong to physics more than metaphysics, it does still remain the case that the question of what individuates these bodies is itself more properly a metaphysical one, just as much as the question of what each one really is in itself. That individuation question might indeed be of little interest to a physicist, even though the bodies themselves are. But it will still be of interest to anyone who cares about the metaphysical foundations of physics; and, of course, Descartes himself cared a great deal about that. So this is my question in the present article: a metaphysical question about the individuation of physical entities.
	Second, I am here concerned with the synchronic individuation of these physical bodies at an instant, more than with their persistence through time. Even if we can find a way to demarcate one region of the indefinite extension of the world, to consider it apart from the remainder and to judge it to be a true corporeal individual in its own right, there might well be additional problems that only start to bite when we seek to re-identify this same individual from one moment to another. But my concern is with the former challenge alone. What is it—if anything—that entitles us to judge that a certain region of the extended world is constituting a particular physical individual at all?
	Finally, I am here concerned with inanimate bodies. Descartes’ scattered writings on Transubstantiation suggest that, when it came to an ensouled body, he had a special account of its individuation as a particular body. A certain portion of matter, Descartes suggested, can qualify as constituting one body when it is all united to one immaterial soul. The particular matter that constitutes a human body can easily come and go in a kind of ‘natural transubstantiation’ (through ingestion, excretion, and whatnot), and this will in no way undermine the identity of the whole, qua human body: for such identity is being conferred upon it from another realm altogether. And, similarly, when a certain quantity of matter comes to enter into a union with Christ’s soul through the consecration of the Eucharist, it will thereby take on the identity of Christ’s body. Admittedly, in the ordinary human case, there is still one constraint that is stemming from the corporeal realm itself. In order for any given particle to be in a position to join with the rest in union with the soul, it does at least need be integrated into the whole, and participate in a single, continuous organic structure. But, in the miracle of Transubstantiation, even that constraint is lifted. Like our bodies, Christ’s might be constituted by one set of particles or another; it might be large or it might be small; and it might be moving or it might be at rest. Unlike ours, Christ’s body could equally well be fleshy or spongy; and it might even be in several places at once, separated from itself through the breaking of the bread. It will still be just one body for all that, because such corporeal modes simply have no bearing on its individuation.​[5]​ But, of course, such considerations as these are not going to help us at all in the case of inanimate bodies. For their individuation, we are going to need to find a different story to tell.
	Unlike in the case of the individuation of those bodies that happen to be united to really distinct, immaterial souls, it seems that any account of the individuation of inanimate bodies is going to need to be drawn up in terms of something proper to those bodies themselves. Now, that might be their attributes, or it might be their modes. But it seems that it cannot be their attributes, because Descartes tells us that all bodies are generically alike in that regard. There is just one principal attribute that pertains to all bodies indifferently, namely extension. And any other essential properties that might be derivable from this principal one—such as impenetrability, or indefinite divisibility—will also necessarily characterise all bodies, meaning that they cannot serve to discriminate between them either. In contrast to the five essentially different elements of the Aristotelians, the essence of Cartesian matter was simply to be a homogeneous indefinite expanse. Although Descartes did draw a distinction of his own between three elements, the only differences between these rested in the sizes, shapes and motions of their respective particles, i.e. not in their attributes but in their accidental modes. And, according to the traditional interpretation of Descartes, the story of corporeal individuation should indeed be spelt out in modal terms.
	Now, this approach is not free of problems either: far from it! For a start, the fact that substances are supposed to be prior to their modes threatens to create difficulties for any attempt to individuate bodies through modes, if we opt to equate bodies with corporeal substances. If the very being of a mode depends on its being supported by the particular substance it modifies, then it is hard to see how it could also serve to define that substance as a particular individual in the first place. This point has been particularly urged by, for instance, C.G. Normore, who concludes that the individuation of corporeal substances must be primitive.​[6]​ And that conclusion may indeed have implications for the individuation of bodies. If we opt simply to equate bodies with corporeal substances, then perhaps their individuation can be primitive too. But this is far from the end of the story. As already noted, we are under no obligation to make such an equation at all. If bodies should instead turn out to be mere modal beings, for instance, then it is only to be expected that their individuation will be determined by the very modes that define them. Besides which, even Normore himself feels that the primitive individuation of corporeal substances can take us only so far. Even when bodies are equated with such substances, it might yet be the case that only some of these bodies/substances are actually relevant to physics. In that case, we will still be owed an explanation of which ones and why. And, when Normore turns his attention to this new question, his answer turns out to be drawn up in modal terms after all. (I shall be returning to this point at the end of section III below). But be all that as it may: as we will be seeing in what follows, the modal approach to corporeal individuation faces some other very grave problems besides this one of Normore’s. Consequently, many commentators have ultimately arrived at the conclusion that such an approach is doomed to failure. Nevertheless, this has at least been their starting point. Most critics have agreed that Descartes did attempt to define corporeal individuality in modal terms, even if they have judged his attempt to be unsuccessful.
	More precisely, the mode that has generally been singled out for these purposes is motion. The idea is that, when one portion of the indefinite expanse of matter is moving, in relation to the immediately surrounding parts, it is thereby to be distinguished from them, and regarded as an individual body in its own right. And there is certainly some textual evidence which seems to support this interpretation, and which has consequently helped to foster it. Most notably—and most frequently noted—Descartes writes in the Principles of Philosophy II, 25: “By ‘one body’ or ‘one piece of matter’ I mean whatever is transferred at a given time.”​[7]​ (I shall postpone a detailed examination of this and related remarks, just for the time being: but I shall certainly be coming back to them later on). There are few if any commentators on this topic who have not concluded, on the basis of remarks like this, that corporeal individuation must, for Descartes, be intimately tied to motion. Thus, for instance, Daniel Garber begins his 1992 study of this cluster of issues by observing: “The idea is, on its surface, a fairly simple and plausible idea; the thought is that from the point of view of physics, an individual is a portion of matter that moves together.” But then, a few pages later, having surveyed some of the difficulties that this notion generates, Garber concludes: “I shall continue to talk as if Descartes is dealing with a world of individual bodies, colliding with one another, at motion and at rest with respect to one another. But, in the end, I suspect that this is something that he is not entitled to, and this is something that, if true, would seriously undermine his whole programme.”​[8]​
	Dennis Des Chene, in his 1996 discussion of the same issues, begins by drawing a distinction between actual and potential parts of matter. His view is that any discernible region of the continuous indefinite expanse, delineated in purely geometrical terms alone, will thereby constitute a potential part of the whole, regardless of whether it should be moving or not. “Potential parts of matter are individuated by reference to the topology implicit in the idea of extension”, Des Chene writes. But then he adds: “Actual parts of matter, on the other hand, are defined by Descartes in terms of motion, or, more precisely, in terms of the fundamental mode of rupture.”​[9]​ And, for Des Chene, it is only the actual parts that qualify as individual physical bodies, of a kind that might be allowed to play a role in mechanical explanations and be covered by laws of nature. And then, just like Garber, Des Chene goes on to note some of the problems faced by this theory of individuation by motion.
	Des Chene cites not only Garber’s discussion of these issues, but also a 1991 discussion from Emily Grosholz, who explores whether it might be possible to establish actual—and not merely potential—corporeal individuality in purely geometrical terms after all, without needing to call upon motion. But she concludes that it is not. “The objects of Descartes’s physics require a dynamic dimension to achieve even the formal unity required for their existence as individuals.”​[10]​ And Anthony Kenny does likewise in an earlier study from 1968. He too considers whether purely geometrical properties could do the job of constituting the boundaries of a single physical body, but he then dismisses this possibility on the grounds that—from a geometrical point of view—all there is to say is simply that “three-dimensional extension stretches uniformly to infinity”. And so, once again, Kenny brings motion into the story, claiming that Descartes accepted that it was indeed this that was responsible for the individuation of bodies. And then, on the basis of an argument to be explored below, Kenny too concludes that Descartes’ position is ultimately untenable.​[11]​
	For still more examples of this tendency to read Descartes (largely on the basis of Principles II, §25) as having sought to tie physical individuality to motion, one might mention Ablondi & Barbone, Anderson, Funkenstein, Holden, Leclerc, Prendergast, or Thiel.​[12]​ Such discussions have usually been accompanied by some examination of the associated problems, problems that most commentators have largely tended to leave unresolved, simply because they feel that no resolution is available within a Cartesian framework. Exceptionally, some of those who have proposed non-standard accounts of the underlying ontology of Cartesian bodies—e.g. Lennon, with his phenomenalist reading—have suggested that this might actually help to solve these problems. But my own view is that such manoeuvring, at least to the extent that this is the motivation for it, is wrong-headed and unnecessary: for what I do not accept is that Descartes ever intended to suggest a link between corporeal individuality and motion in the first place. I happen not to share Lennon’s interpretation of Descartes, but that is beside the point. For the thing that Lennon does still seem to want to retain is a connection between motion and the individuation of bodies, and it is only because he treats both as mind-dependent that he believes his interpretation can succeed. But that is the connection that I want to sever. My view is that corporeal individuation, for Descartes, simply has nothing to do with motion.
	In the following sections, I shall discuss a couple of the actual problems here, problems at which I have so far only gestured. I shall then explore the relevant Cartesian texts themselves, the ones that have commonly been thought to link individuality to motion, and explain my own alternative reading of them.

II	THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MOTION

	Several different problems are discussed by the authors just cited, and I am not going to trawl through all of them again here. Instead, I shall focus on just one pair of problems, in order to illustrate why the link between motion and corporeal individuality is thought to be so unsatisfactory. The trouble is that, if we take at face value what Descartes seems to be saying in Principles of Philosophy II, 25, his position seems to preclude the very possibility that anything should ever move; and yet (as we will be seeing in the next section below) it also seems to preclude the possibility that anything should ever be at rest.
	The relevant portion of this section (here as Cottingham, Stoothoff & Murdoch render it) reads as follows:

If, on the other hand, we consider what should be understood by motion, not in common usage but in accordance with the truth of the matter, and if our aim is to assign a determinate nature to it, we may say that motion is the transfer of one piece of matter, or one body, from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in immediate contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies. By ‘one body’ or ‘one piece of matter’ I mean whatever is transferred at a given time, even though this may in fact consist of many parts which have different motions relative to each other.​[13]​

Whereas Aristotle’s conception of motion had encompassed any kind of change that an enduring object might undergo, Descartes felt that local motion was the only kind that really needed to be addressed. He felt that any other changes, e.g. qualitative ones, could be explained mechanically in terms of the various local motions of the object’s microscopic parts. And so, in contrast to Aristotle’s deliberately broad definition of motion as ‘the actuality of a potentiality as such’, Descartes felt that it ought to be possible to define it in a far more straightforward and intuitive way, simply as a change of place.​[14]​ As for his notion of (‘external’) place itself, however, that was broadly in keeping with Aristotle’s own conception of it. Regarding all extension as corporeal, Descartes was unable to avail himself of any kind of distinct space, to use as an absolute frame of reference when defining a notion like place (as, of course, Newton would later be doing). All that he had to work with were the bodies themselves. So he opted to define the place of one body as its situation among other bodies; or, more precisely, as the surface where it met its immediate neighbours in the plenum.​[15]​ If the body should then relinquish contact with those surrounding bodies, so as to come into contact with some new ones instead, it would thereby qualify as moving. If it remained in contact with the same immediately surrounding bodies, it would be at rest. And, as the second part of this passage from §25 then seems to suggest, corporeal individuality will go hand in hand with motion thus understood. Wherever we find such a motion, there we will find an object that can justly be called ‘one’ body. The individual in question will be constituted by the totality of the matter that happens to lie within the surface that is getting breached. 
	It should be noted that this fundamental notion of separation or ‘rupture’ (as Des Chene calls it) is something that happens at an instant. The body is either in contact with those particular surroundings, or it is not: there is no middle ground that it could occupy for an elongated period of time. When something begins to move from a standing start, there will be a particular durationless moment such that, for each of the recent moments strictly earlier than this one, it will have been in contact with the same surrounding cluster of bodies; and, for each of the moments strictly later than it, it will no longer be in contact with them. At the moment in question, but only at that one moment, it will be in the act of separating from them. It is very true that Descartes thought that it would take time for a body actually to traverse any real distance. But even that journey could be broken down into a sequence of indefinitely many steps, in each of which the body would be in the process of passing through some intermediate situation. As Descartes told Henry More: “indeed I think that motion, considered as such a mode, continually changes. For there is one mode in the first point of a body A in that it is separated from the first point of a body B; and another mode in that it is separated from the second point; and another mode in that it is separated from the third point; and so on.”​[16]​ When a body progresses smoothly along a certain path, there will be a temporal instant and a spatial point such that the front of the object coincides with that point at that instant; but where the front coincided with a point behind it at each instant strictly earlier than this one, and will be coinciding with a point in front of it at each instant strictly later. And so, in just the same way as space can be conceptually—though perhaps only conceptually—broken down into a continuous sequence of extensionless points, and time can be similarly broken down into a sequence of durationless moments, motion itself can be broken down into a sequence of durationless ruptures. And this notion of motion at an instant does at least have the right sort of character to support a theory of synchronic individuation. But whether it can actually do so is another matter entirely.
	Descartes held that, whenever any body moved at all, a whole ring of bodies would need to move along with it. When one body moves, given that a vacuum is impossible, the body behind it will need to move too, in order to fill the space that the first one is leaving, lest that space should wind up being left empty.​[17]​ Equally, when one body moves, given that corporeal penetration is also impossible, the body in front of it will need to move, in order to make way for it.​[18]​ Any individual motion will therefore require a whole chain of bodies all to move together. Rather than allowing this chain of moving bodies to extend indefinitely far, Descartes felt that it should loop back on itself, so that the last body will take the place of the first one at the very moment when it leaves it. Notwithstanding Descartes’ second law of nature, that the motion of each individual body will always tend to continue in a straight line unless subjected to an external influence, it nevertheless remains the case that the individual motion of one body will need to participate in a larger system of motions that collectively forms, if not a geometrically precise circle, then at least a closed loop.​[19]​
	So let us consider such a loop.​[20]​ And let us suppose that, whatever is going on within the outermost boundary of this ring of bodies, the ring as a whole is not actually migrating from one place to another. After all, if the entire ring did move as a single unit, that would just serve to generate a new, larger ring, as this one displaced the matter just in front of it, and was itself replaced by the matter just behind; in which case we could just shift our focus to consider that larger ring itself, and our problem—to the extent that there is a problem here—would turn out to arise there instead. Let us suppose too that the bodies that collectively constitute our ring are all obediently playing follow-the-leader, rather than jostling for position amongst themselves. After all, any such relative transferences among the individual constituents of the ring would serve to generate further rings at a smaller scale; in which case we could shift our focus to consider one of those smaller rings instead, and our problem would turn out to arise there. Either way, the problem will not be eliminated: it will merely be transposed to a different scale.
	Now, Edward Slowik (alluding to the individuation clause in §25, whereby ‘one body’ is to be understood as all of the matter that is getting transferred together) writes that “an entire ring of circling bodies would seem to qualify as a single body given Descartes’ criterion for identity”.​[21]​ But nothing could be further from the case. According to our supposition, the entire ring is not getting transferred away from the vicinity of the bodies that surround it. Therefore, according to Descartes’ definition of motion, the ring as a whole is not moving. Whatever it is doing, it is keeping its activity entirely self-contained within its own outermost boundary: but the only changes that qualify as motions in the Cartesian sense are the ones that cross that boundary. But then, if the ring as a whole is not moving, it seems that it should not be regarded as an individual either. It does not matter whether the motions within the ring should follow a geometrically circular route, with the outermost surface of the ring defining a tidy torus, or alternatively whether it should take on some far more irregular figure. It could even involve divergent channels, just as long as these all meet up. All that matters, for the present conclusion to follow, is that this surface, however irregular it might be, is not currently in the act of getting breached. (I am going to need to return to the case of irregular vortices later in this section, for these do indeed throw up certain problems for the overall argument here: just not at this point in the argument). The surface might even be on the verge of becoming breached, whether through the ring’s migrating as a whole, or indeed through its disintegration, e.g. if one of its parts should leave the rest and enter a different vortex in a comet-like way. But still, we are here concerned with synchronic identity, and consequently with whether the surface of our ring is in the act of being breached right now. If it is, then we just need to shift our attention to the larger ring that this motion is generating, and consider that one instead. But, if it is not, then §25 seems to imply that our ring is not to be regarded as an individual body.
	But is this a problem? After all, in Descartes’ corpuscularian physics, it is the individual motions of the microscopic parts of objects that are supposed to be doing all the real work. Although we might find it convenient to dress up our physical explanations in the familiar language of wholes, the actual content of such explanations will often be coming more from the interactions of those parts themselves. So, just as long as Descartes has the parts, perhaps he need not worry about the status of the wholes. A mereological nihilist can still be a good corpuscularian.
	Let us accept, then, that the ring as a whole is not moving, and even accept that (for that reason) it should not qualify as a true individual. It seems that we can still make perfectly good sense of what is going on here, by focusing solely on its parts. Although Descartes himself tended to skirt around this point, it was clearly and succinctly expressed by Pierre Bayle in his (broadly Cartesian) Sistême abrégé de philosophie of the late 1670s. Bayle begins by considering a globe that actually is passing as a whole from one place to another—as it might be, a falling raindrop—and he says more or less what Descartes would have said about such a case. But it is his second sentence that is relevant to us:

When a globe is in motion, it can be said that the parts taken collectively are moved, and that each of them taken distributively is at rest, because it remains joined to the neighbouring part, and united by a common bond with all the others. By contrast, when a circle moves around its centre, each of its parts taken separately must pass from one place to another, but all taken together are at rest; for it is certain that the entire circle does not then pass from one place to another place at all, although each of its parts passes into the place of another part.​[22]​

Admittedly, even when we limit our attention to the individual parts of the circle—or the ring, or anything else that rotates in one place about an axis—it is only the superficial ones that will qualify as moving. We are supposing that the enclosed internal parts, rather than jostling for priority, are nestling in fixed positions amongst their immediate neighbours. And if they are at rest in relation to their neighbours, then they are at rest tout court.​[23]​ But, as the ring rotates, any part that does actually meet the matter outside the ring will be in the act of separating from the immediately adjacent part of that matter. And the rotation of the ring will simply consist in the fact that all of the superficial parts of the ring, along the plane of rotation, are passing by all of the parts of the contiguous external matter in the same order.
	But the trouble is that the individuation clause of §25 not only seems to undermine the individuality of the whole: it does not seem to allow the parts to qualify as true corporeal individuals either. For which parts, precisely, are we talking about here? Well, let us consider a certain region of the two-dimensional surface of the circulating ring—but a region less than the whole because, across its whole surface, we are supposing that the ring is not being transferred away from its surroundings. The matter inside this particular region of the surface is getting transferred away from the immediately contiguous external matter; and, prima facie, this does indeed seem to be enough to give us a bona fide case of Cartesian motion. So far, so good.
	But this is still not precise enough. To what object, exactly, are we ascribing this alleged motion? We cannot ascribe it to this region of the surface itself, because a surface, or even just a portion of one, is simply the wrong kind of entity to support an ascription of motion. A surface is a two-dimensional limit, demarcating a three-dimensional body from its surroundings. It is merely a mode of such bodies.​[24]​ But then, so too is the motion itself; and an entity really does need to be three-dimensional in order to be capable to bearing such modes. Only then can it possess the kind of bulk that goes into the calculation of ‘quantity of motion’, a central concept in Cartesian physics. If an object was to lack extension, even if only in one of the three dimensions, the calculation of its bulk and hence its quantity of motion would involve a multiplication by zero, with the result that it would have a quantity of motion equal to zero, i.e. it would have no motion.
	Now, this might not seem like a problem, because there is an easy and obvious response. True enough, we cannot ascribe Cartesian motion to this region of the ring’s surface as such: but that is not what we are doing here. Instead, we really are ascribing it to a three-dimensional part of the ring. The part in question will be such that its own outer surface is indeed defined by this particular portion of the ring’s overall surface. But that will be constituting merely one face of our three-dimensional part, one that is contraposed against an opposite face that will be constituted by a certain surface defined within the matter of the ring. We will conceptually scoop out some of the ring’s own matter, and this scoop will be the object to which the motion will be ascribed.
	But the question is: where do we make the cut? Should we delve deeply into the interior of the ring, so as to consider a rather bulky part; or should we stay closer to the surface, making for a much shallower (though still three-dimensional) part? Should the interior face of our scoop be flat, or convex, or concave, or take on some more irregular form? Indeed, even with respect to the outer face of this part, the one that does coincide with a region of the ring’s total surface, should we be considering a larger region (just as long as it is still less than the whole) or a smaller one; and what shape should this be?
	If there were natural fault lines within the matter of the ring, then we could use these to guide us as we mentally carve its matter up into physically distinct units. But, wherever else such fault lines might be coming from, they cannot be coming from motion, precisely because we are supposing that there are no internal motions between the various regions of the ring. Perhaps motion might partially define a boundary for a superficial part of the ring, inasmuch as this part will indeed be separating from its external neighbours; but motion cannot fully define its boundary, because it is not separating from its internal neighbours. But then, if we cannot define a boundary for it all the way around, then which superficial part we are even talking about here? Considerations of motion in such a case can do nothing to commend one geometrically definable internal boundary over any other, so as to give one ‘scoop’ an elevated degree of reality over any other. They will all be on a par. Either all such regions will already constitute actual physical individuals in their own right, quite independently of motion; or else all of them will be at best potential individuals. But then, if we read §25 as saying that ‘one body’ just means the same thing as ‘whatever is transferred together’, then it seems that nothing other than motion will be sufficient to transform the various conceptually distinguishable regions of a body into so many actually diverse physical individuals. And so it seems that, in the absence of motions among the internal parts, we have no actual distinctions among those parts. But we need such distinctions, in order to make sense of the rotation of the whole. Just as Bayle suggested, this rotation depends on what the “parts taken separately” are doing: but, in this case, it seems that the parts cannot be taken separately. These supposed parts of a homogeneous ring, given that they are at rest in relation to one another, will all meld into one, and all that we will be left with is the whole. Except that we will not even be left with that. Given that the whole, as a whole, is at rest in relation to its wider surroundings, its own individual identity will likewise evaporate as it finds itself absorbed into them.
	And so it seems that nothing in Descartes’ universe can move. For this is by no means a singular problem about a special case. On the contrary, this is the situation we get into whenever anything tries to move. Such a motion in one individual would necessitate motions in a complete ring of individuals around it. But then the first body would find itself absorbed totally into such a ring, since no considerations of motion could support any distinction between it and the one that it was following immediately ahead, or the one that was following it immediately behind. It would thereby lose its individuality; which would mean in turn that there would be no subject there for us to ascribe that original motion to. All that we would be left with is the ring as a whole. But then, since the ring as a whole would be retaining contact with the same surrounding matter, it would not qualify as moving either, and consequently it too would fail to qualify as an individual. Hence, no motion and no bodies.
	However, there might still be a solution available, even without severing the alleged link between motion and corporeal individuality. I have thus far been supposing both that the ring under consideration is not breaching its outermost boundary, and that its own parts (if any!) are all playing follow-the-leader, rather than shifting position amongst themselves. As far as the former is concerned, any such breach would simply provide us with a larger ring to consider instead of this one; while, in the latter case, we would need to consider the smaller rings that were getting generated by any such internal motions among the parts. And we can continue to disregard the former scenario, not because it is not a genuine possibility—for it surely is that—but simply because this possibility does not seem to throw any additional considerations into the mix here, neither creating any new problems nor suggesting any new solutions. However, now that we have started to focus our attention directly on the parts of these vortices rather than the wholes, the latter scenario does need to be considered more carefully. For maybe those smaller rings are indeed the key, to giving us the parts we need to make sense of the rotations of the larger ones.
	In particular, the vortices that we should consider are the irregular ones. Descartes was content for some rings of circulating bodies to be perfectly uniform. ‘We can easily understand this in the case of a perfect circle’, he observed when first discussing such rings.​[25]​ But then he proceeded to acknowledge that many such rings would not be quite so regular; and he observed that, in those cases, there would need to be internal motions among the parts. If the ring should narrow at one point, the same quantity of matter would still need to pass through the narrowed section of the ring as is passing through each other section in any given length of time. Otherwise, there would be a backlog, which would entail both corporeal penetration behind the bottleneck and a void in front of it, both of which are impossible. But, if the same quantity of matter is going to pass through this narrowed section in the same amount of time, it will need to elongate, to compensate for the reduction in its cross-sectional area. And, in order for that to happen, some of the internal parts of this quantity will need to move outwards from the newly constricted interior, to populate the newly expanded surface instead. Or, even if the ring is retaining the same cross-sectional area throughout, its parts will still need to change positions amongst themselves if its curvature should change along its perimeter. In an S-bend, for instance, what had been the shorter inside stretch of the curve will become the longer outside stretch, meaning that the preponderance of parts will need to shift across from one side to the other.
	Now, once we have actually moving internal parts in our ring, we might be able to use these to demarcate the superficial parts themselves, while still retaining the supposed link between motion and individuality. These internal motions will give us the ‘fault lines’ we need within the matter of the ring, so as then to be able to trace boundaries all the way around the superficial parts, defining internal faces for them to complement the outer faces they are deriving from the ring’s overall surface. And then, once we are thus equipped with a multiplicity of fully defined superficial parts, we can start to consider what those parts taken separately are actually doing, recognise that they are all passing by the same external bodies in the same order, and thereby get a grip on the rotation of the whole. Of course, any such motions among the internal parts of our ring will indeed need to be associated with and facilitated by smaller rings of their own. And, in order to make sense of those circulations, we will again need to be in a position to appeal to actual individual motions among their own even smaller internal parts, in order to demarcate their own superficial parts, so as then to be able to consider what those superficial parts taken separately are doing. And those smaller internal motions will generate still further rings, the possibility of which will depend on moving internal parts at a still smaller scale. The threat of an infinite (or, as Descartes would prefer to say, an indefinite) regress should be clear. But what is not so clear is that Descartes would actually regard such a regress as a problem. Perhaps it really can just carry on all the way down to indefinite littleness.
	For it was precisely in this context, of irregular vortices and the internal motions of smaller parts that would be required to render them possible, that Descartes suggested that there might be particles of the first element that were actually indefinitely small.​[26]​ Now, the notion of an actually indefinitely small particle does, admittedly, bring plenty of problems of its own. But, to the extent that we can make sense of that notion, such particles might give us everything we need to sort out the problem at hand. For, although the irregular vortices might be the only ones that need to involve actually indefinitely small particles, there is no obvious reason why regular ones should not be allowed to involve them too. And, if it was to turn out that everything in the Cartesian universe was in fact made up of such indefinitely small particles, each one actually moving in relation to its own immediate surroundings, then perhaps this might give us everything we need. The motion of one body will still depend in the same old way on the circulation of a complete ring of matter in which it is participating. But it will no longer be in the same danger of losing its identity as it melds into the other parts of this ring, just as long as, in addition to the fact that these parts are all drifting together around the whole ring, they are also shifting about in relation to one another. Those individual motions will indeed depend on smaller motions, and those in turn on even smaller ones: but this hierarchy will be grounded by the actually indefinitely small moving particles at the bottom.
	But then, Descartes never actually says that all vortices must involve indefinitely little particles: he only says this of the irregular ones. And, even there, there is no obvious physical reason why all irregular vortices must involve actually indefinitely little particles: merely little ones should suffice to account for the irregularity of most of them. Besides which, Descartes also makes it abundantly clear that only some matter is supposed to be thus divided into the first element. Even in this same discussion of irregular vortices, he also writes: ‘It should be noted, however, that I am not here speaking of the whole of the matter, but merely of some part of it.’​[27]​ Although there were supposed to be a lot of these indefinitely little particles in the Cartesian universe, separating the larger particles of the second and third elements from one another, those larger particles themselves were supposed to be completely homogeneous, with no motions and consequently no physical complexity among their own internal parts. This was indeed how the three elements were meant to differ from one another, by the sizes and shapes of their particles. If the grosser particles of the second and third elements were such that their own constituent parts were moving individuals in their own right, then these particles would thereby qualify as masses of particles of the first element after all, rather than particles of the second and third as we are supposing. But Descartes was adamant that not everything was actually divided as far as that. There really did exist particles of the second and third elements.
	But then it seems to follow that these larger particles, at least, should not be able to rotate about their axes. Exactly the same problem will arise as arose over the vortices themselves: for what, after all, is the rotation of a globe but the rotation of a torus whose major radius happens to be zero? With no distinct internal parts, we cannot define a multiplicity of distinct superficial parts; and, without such superficial parts to consider separately, we cannot even define what it would mean for such a globe to rotate. And yet Descartes explicitly held not only that such particles could rotate, but that they could even produce real physical effects thereby. The various rotations of the globules of the second element, for instance, were central to his theory of the variety of colours in light. It is true that, in order to be able to propagate light as such, these globules were also supposed to be moving rectilinearly (at least a little bit, just enough to nudge along their neighbours in a pressure wave through the aether). But they were supposed to have additional physical effects that arose directly out of their rotation, effects that would not result if they were just moving rectilinearly without spinning as they did so. For a body to be red, for instance, was for it to be “disposed to make it such that the little parts of this subtle matter, which are only pushed in straight lines by luminous bodies, also move in circles around their centres after encountering it; and such that their two motions have, between them, the proportion that is required to make us sense the colour red”.​[28]​ But, without actual parts in the globule, each one an individual in its own right whose motion (in relation to the matter outside the globule) we can consider apart from that of its neighbours, we can make no sense of this additional component in its overall motion. 
	And so we see that the alleged connection between motion and individuality in Descartes’ system tends to undermine, or at least to restrict, the very possibility of the former, and consequently the possibility of the latter too. But for motion to be impossible in Descartes’ universe—or even just for it to be impossible in the absence of actually indefinite division into particles of the first element—is seriously problematic, given just how central motion is to Descartes’ mechanical physics. But then, given this way of understanding corporeal individuality in terms of motion, it turns out that his universe cannot include bodies at rest either.

III	THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF (AND YET THE NECESSITY FOR) REST

	The argument on this side of the coin is really very straightforward; indeed, we have already seen the reason why nothing can be at rest. On the face of it, Descartes seems to be telling us in §25 that ‘one body’ or ‘one piece of matter’ just means the same thing as ‘whatever is transferred at a given time’. If this claim is offering—as it appears to be, and as any good definition surely should—not only sufficient but also necessary conditions for corporeal individuality, then of course the possibility of a resting individual will be ruled out. If a body is at rest, it will not be a body. Indeed, it will not even be a part of a body. (Although Cottingham, Stoothoff & Murdoch opt for the word “piece”, the Latin here is “unam partem materiae”).
	It is true of course that Descartes regarded extension as indefinitely divisible, meaning that any portion of it must be separable from its surroundings. He observed of the universal matter in Principles I, 60, that “each and every part of it, as delimited by us in our thought, is really distinct from the other parts of the same substance”, and he used this example to illustrate his wider conception of a real distinction, i.e. that which held between things that could exist in separation from one another.​[29]​ This possibility of separate existence seems to connote substantiality, as Descartes confirmed elsewhere in this same passage from the Principles, and again indicated in a remark from a 1642 letter to Gibieuf: “I consider the two halves of a part of matter, however small it may be, as two complete substances”.​[30]​ So, at least if we read such remarks in isolation, it turns out that there is a genuine plurality of corporeal substances here after all. But, as I noted at the outset, my concern is not with those metaphysical substances, so much as with physical bodies, i.e. the things that feature in mechanical explanations of natural phenomena. The latter might just be equated with the former: but they need not be. And the point to note is that divisibility and the mere possibility of separation are not the same as division and actual separation; and potential individuality is not the same thing as actual individuality. And, on the face of it, actual physical individuality for a body still seems to be going hand in hand with its actual separation from its surroundings, not merely with the possibility thereof. Bodies that are not actually moving may or may not still be substances: but it seems that they are not actual bodies. Recall Des Chene’s suggestion that the resting parts of a body must be construed as merely potential parts, ones that will only become actual corporeal individuals in their own right when they do begin to move independently of the rest.​[31]​ Garber draws the same conclusion, and he rightly describes it as “the rather paradoxical view that all individual bodies must be in motion”.​[32]​
	And yet this conclusion flies in the face of what Descartes actually tells us. Numerous passages in Descartes’ writings make it clear that he was perfectly comfortable with the notion of bodies or actual parts of matter at rest. To give just one example, he wrote to Clerselier in 1645: “by ‘motionless body’ I mean a body which is not acting so as to separate its surface from those of the other bodies surrounding it, and which consequently forms part of another hard body bigger than it”.​[33]​ And (as should really go without saying) he was similarly comfortable with the notion of bodies in motion. For instance, he claimed in the Principles that sizes, shapes and motions were presented to the mind ‘as things, or modes of things, existing (or at least capable of existing) outside thought’; and that, if God should cause our idea of matter “to be produced by something which lacked extension, shape and motion, there would be no way of avoiding the conclusion that he should be regarded as a deceiver” (emphasis added).​[34]​ Indeed, putting both of these points together, Descartes remained emphatic: “that a body could exist without any of its particles being either at motion or at rest […] is something which never entered my mind”.​[35]​ If our conclusion is that Cartesian bodies cannot move, but cannot be at rest either, then something has clearly gone badly wrong. And in fact we can do much more than merely point to pronouncements like these. When we look more deeply at the terms of Descartes’ physical theory, what becomes clear is that his own principles, far from ruling it out, were in fact requiring him to countenance actual bodies at rest, as well as ones in motion. He could not have done his physics unless he had both things to work with.
	Consider this: why is it that motion, and things in motion, should be regarded as having a special kind of significance for a physicist? On the face of it, the answer seems obvious: things in motion are actually having physical effects in the world. Indeed, on the face of it, they seem to be the only things that are having such effects. Descartes tells us, in §23 of Principles II, just before offering his comments on motion and individuation in §25: “If the division into parts occurs simply in our thought, there is no resulting change; any variation in matter or diversity in its many forms depends on motion.”​[36]​ The contrast with Principles I, §60, where “each and every part of it, as delimited by us in our thought, is really distinct from the other parts”, is striking. Those merely mental delineations might latch onto substances that are really distinct at a metaphysical level, but it appears that they do not give us physically distinct bodies, i.e. the kinds of individuals that are actually bringing about distinct physical effects. For the latter, §23 seems to suggest that motion is required; leading in turn to the conclusion that bodies at rest are not true bodies. 
	But the point to appreciate, and the reason why this conclusion does not in fact follow, is that Descartes regarded rest and motion as being precisely on a par. Rest, for Descartes, did just as much work as motion itself did, and physical work at that. Motion and rest were together the twin causal and explanatory principles of Descartes’ mechanical physics. Whereas most of Descartes’ contemporaries and successors—even some prominent ‘Cartesians’ among them, such as Malebranche​[37]​—were inclined to treat rest simply as a privation, i.e. the absence of motion, Descartes himself felt that it really did need to be regarded as something real, positive, and physically active in its own right. So, to the extent that the physical activity of moving bodies entails that they must be regarded as actual physical individuals, so too must resting bodies be, for exactly the same reason. Bodies at rest are doing things, every bit as much as bodies in motion are.
	Rest, for Descartes, played a crucial role in the establishment of solid bodies. He felt that it was the glue that served to bind the parts of bodies together, in such a way as to ensure that the whole would retain its integrity over time. “We certainly cannot think up any kind of glue which could fix together the particles of two bodies any more firmly than is achieved simply by their being at rest.”​[38]​ Descartes’ view was that, for any mode a body might happen to have, the immutability of God would serve to establish an accompanying inertial force of that mode’s own self-preservation.​[39]​ This was, indeed, Descartes’ first law of nature and, although he most frequently appealed to it in relation to motion, he did make it explicit that it was supposed to encompass other modes too, including rest:

From God’s immutability we can also know certain rules or laws of nature, which are the secondary and particular causes of the various motions we see in bodies. The first of these laws is that each thing, in so far as it is simple and undivided, always remains in the same state, as far as it can, and never changes except as a result of external causes. Thus, if a piece of matter is square, we can be sure without much ado that it will remain square for ever, unless something coming from outside changes its shape. If it is at rest, we hold that it will never begin to move unless it is pushed into motion by some cause. And if it moves, there is equally no reason for thinking it will ever lose this motion of its own accord and without being checked by something else. (Emphasis added).​[40]​

If a body at rest is pushed by another that is moving, then something has got to give. Given that corporeal penetration is ruled out, either the resting body will need to move, to make way for the other, or the other will need to be deflected or rebounded. Descartes’ view was that the precise outcome in any given case would depend on which was the greater: the inertial force that the first body had to retain the same state of rest, or the inertial force that the second had to retain the same state of motion (which, in effect, was Descartes’ third law of nature).​[41]​ So, as far as Descartes was concerned, the cohesion of parts in a solid body really was going to be explicable in terms of this force of rest, and physically explicable at that. A body’s rest (in relation, as always, to its own immediate surroundings) is a corporeal mode, and it is a physical law (albeit one with a more metaphysical grounding in God’s immutability) that any such mode should come with a self-preserving tendency built into it. Therefore, parts that are resting alongside one another will naturally tend to remain so over time, even to the point of resisting efforts to separate them.
	I already noted in the opening section to this article that there were contexts in which Descartes took other approaches to the individuation of bodies, ones that made no mention of motion. In the miracle of Transubstantiation, for instance, or merely in the natural cycle of matter in an animated body, the body was supposed to derive its individuality from the soul to which it was united. Garber acknowledges this, but he draws a contrast between those other contexts and the purely physical ones. As already noted, Garber continues to interpret §25 as entailing that “from the point of view of physics, an individual is a portion of matter that moves together”.​[42]​ But the point about Descartes’ explanation of the cohesion of parts in a solid body is that the context is a purely physical one. And Descartes could never have given an explanation of solidity in terms of rest, if there was no such thing as rest. And he could not have postulated the real existence of a corporeal mode like rest, unless he also countenanced some real corporeal subject to which it might attach itself. But this mode cannot very well attach itself to a subject that is moving: as Descartes tells us, nothing could be more contrary to motion than rest. Therefore it must attach itself to something at rest; and therefore there must be some thing at rest. The parts of solid bodies must be real individuals in their own right, despite the fact that they are at rest with respect to one another, in order for it to be possible for them to be at rest with respect to one another, and thereby to account for that very solidity. As Descartes himself tells us, when discussing the cohesion of parts in an iron nail with a view to explaining why it should resist the efforts of our (relatively more fluid) hands to separate it, each half of the nail ‘may be considered to be an individual body’ (pro uno corpore numerare) and ‘has the nature of an individual body’ (rationem habet unius corporis).​[43]​ It needs to be an individual, because it is acting as an individual in clinging so firmly to the neighbouring half, and remaining at rest alongside it despite the best efforts of our hands to cause the two halves to move apart. And so, although a single common motion might be sufficient to make a body qualify as an actual individual, it cannot be necessary. Parts of matter at rest must be actual parts from a physical point of view as well as a metaphysical one, because they are actually having real physical effects. 
	So what are we to make of Principles II, 23: “If the division into parts occurs simply in our thought, there is no resulting change; any variation in matter or diversity in its many forms depends on motion”? The remark in Principles I, 60, about the real distinction of those parts that we delimit in thought, seemed to endow each one with a potentiality for individual causal activity; but now this §23 remark appears, after all, to deny that most of them are actually causing anything. But, as a matter of fact, it does not deny this at all. All that it says is that these resting portions are not actually causing any changes in the world. But that is precisely as it should be! For something to remain at rest in relation to its neighbours—i.e. for adjacent pieces of matter to continue to cohere together as parts of a larger whole, rather than separating—means precisely that it is not changing. There is indeed no variation or diversity of forms across the various different parts of a solid body: when these parts are all resting peacefully alongside one another, the whole will be uniform and homogeneous. And yet it will be a physical fact that these parts are actually remaining at rest, a fact that requires a physical explanation, and that explanation will be given in terms of the mutual rest of the individual parts. Rest and motion, for Descartes, are every bit as real, actual, physical, self-preserving and causally efficacious as one another. Both of them feature in Descartes’ laws of nature: bodies at rest are addressed not only in the first law, and implicitly in the third, but also in the fourth, fifth and sixth impact rules. And both of them feature in mechanical explanations of natural phenomena: the former explains diversity and change in the world, while the latter explains uniformity and permanence. If these are the criteria that define what we mean by ‘actual physical bodies’, then bodies at rest and bodies in motion both equally qualify for that title.
	 As already noted, Normore takes the view that Cartesian corporeal substances are individuated primitively, rather than through motion, meaning that he needs to explain away the appearance of a link between corporeal individuation and motion in §25. His solution, echoing Garber’s ‘from the point of view of physics’, is to say that Descartes “is not defining ‘body,’ but rather picking out the bodies which are the relevant ones for his physics. Descartes’s laws of motion apply precisely to bodies in the sense of Principles II, 25—that is to items which have a common motion and which are themselves in motion relative to one another.”​[44]​ Or, again, Thomas Holden draws an ‘actual parts’ interpretation of Descartes directly out of Principles I, 60, and the 1642 letter to Gibieuf, meaning that he too needs to address the apparently superfluous link to motion in §25. His explanation is likewise that, “for the purposes of his physics, Descartes holds that the parts of matter are individuated by their relative motion […]. But this account applies merely to his physics: his treatment of the laws of dynamics.”​[45]​ But it is simply incorrect to say that Descartes’ laws apply only to bodies in motion: several of them also apply to bodies at rest. And, if rest is being treated as something real in its own right, on a par with (and opposed to) motion, then the bearers of such rest must themselves be treated as just as real and just as relevant to physics as those bodies that happen to be moving. Deborah Brown also follows Normore’s discussion of the primitive individuation of corporeal substances, meaning that she too needs to explain the “mystery” of §25. Her answer is that “although bodies are already individuated in re, our ability to conceptualise one body as distinct from others requires us to consider it actually or counterfactually in different locations relative to different bodies at different times”.​[46]​ But can we not conceptualise a body that is remaining in the same location at different times? Descartes’ answer would clearly be yes.




	The remarks on Transubstantiation and animated bodies already suggest that motion, although perhaps sufficient, cannot be necessary for corporeal individuality. The remarks on rest, and the special emphasis that Descartes placed on that as something real and positive in its own right, demonstrate that it certainly cannot be. So what are we to make of passages like Principles II, 25, where Descartes appears to suggest that there is a genuine definitional equivalence between motion and individuality? There are actually remarkably few such passages, a fact that should already begin to rouse suspicions over Descartes’ commitment to such an equivalence: but there are a couple.
	I already quoted Cottingham, Stoothoff & Murdoch’s translation of the crucial remark, at the beginning of my own second section above. To recall, they write in particular: “By ‘one body’ or ‘one piece of matter’ I mean whatever is transferred at a given time.” In Descartes’ own 1644 Latin text, the full passage reads as follows:

Sed si non tam ex vulgi usu, quàm ex rei veritate, consideremus quid per motum debeat intelligi, ut aliqua ei determinata natura tribuatur: dicere possumus esse translationem unius partis materiae, sive unius corporis, ex viciniâ eorum corpurum, quae illud immediatè contingunt & tanquam quiescentia spectantur, in viciniam aliorum. Ubi per unum corpus, sive unam partem materiae, intelligo id omne quod simul transfertur; etsi rursus hoc ipsum constare possit ex multis partibus, quae alios in se habeant motus.​[47]​

But the trouble is that Cottingham, Stoothoff & Murdoch have missed out a word. The first word of that second sentence, “ubi” (“where”), is nowhere to be seen in their translation. Among the other published English translations, the same is true of Haldane & Ross’s, and Veitch’s, and Ariew’s too.​[48]​ But most anglophone commentators will have been working (at least for everyday purposes) from one or another of these translations; and it is hard not to suspect that this fact has helped to foster the impression that there is supposed to be a genuine equivalence between ‘one body’ and ‘whatever is transferred at a given time’, such that this transference will be necessary as well as sufficient for physical individuality. But then, this is not only true of anglophone commentators. Even Claude Picot missed out this word in his 1647 French translation (AT IXB, 76); and, given that most French commentators will have been working from that, the same impression has tended to arise among them too. See, for instance, Geneviève Lewis’s important discussion of corporeal individuality in the second chapter of her groundbreaking L’Individualité selon Descartes.​[49]​ I have only found two translations where the sense of Descartes’ “ubi” is captured at all. Thus, Miller & Miller have: “By one body, or one part of matter, I here understand everything which is simultaneously transported.”​[50]​ And Anscombe & Geach have: “Here, when I speak of a body or a piece of matter, I mean something that is all transferred at once.”​[51]​ And yet, even in that latter case, note that Anscombe & Geach opted to follow Descartes in placing the word “here” at the beginning of the sentence. This fact has made it all too easy for others simply to omit the word when quoting from their translation—and even to place a capital ‘W’ on their “when”, as if the sentence had started there—and this has once again helped to foster the idea of that motion is necessary for corporeal individuality. Prendergast does this, for instance, and Anderson does it twice.​[52]​ The word “ubi”—or, in these two translations, the word “here”—may only be a small one: but, in its context, it is crucial. It significantly alters the sense of what Descartes was aiming to do in this passage.
	What the presence of this little word suggests is that Descartes was not proposing a genuine definitional equivalence between ‘one body’ and ‘everything which is simultaneously transported’ after all. He was merely explicating one sense of the concept, but doing so without intending to exclude the possibility of others. The literal sense of the Latin is: “we can say that [motion] is the translation of one part of matter or of one body […] where by ‘one body’ or ‘one part of matter’, I understand all that is transferred together”. That is to say that, for present purposes, Descartes is understanding the individuation of bodies in terms of shared motion. If a certain quantity of matter is all getting transferred together, this will indeed be a sufficient condition for its qualifying as a single body. But it need not be a necessary condition. The first sentence, by establishing a context for the second, is such as to limit its scope. Given that that first sentence has just been saying something about moving bodies, it is only to be expected that the second one will likewise be saying something about those bodies. But there is no reason to suppose that it will be saying anything at all about other bodies, ones that might not be moving. These other bodies could well become relevant in other contexts; and, in those other contexts, other conceptions of ‘one body’ might well be more applicable.
	The purpose of the inclusion of this second sentence in §25 is indicated by its own second half. What Descartes was seeking to do here was deflect a potential criticism or misunderstanding. He anticipated that it might be supposed that the presence of individual motions among the various component parts of a whole would serve to undermine the unity of that whole. And so he wanted to make it clear that he did not believe that this was the case. A certain quantity of matter could still be regarded as an individual—and could consequently be a proper subject for study by physicists, and fit to feature in mechanical explanations of natural phenomena—even if its smaller parts were shifting about in relation to one another. For, after all, the microscopic parts of bodies usually would be shifting about in relation to one another. But, although many of Descartes’ explanations of this or that phenomenon would be framed in terms of the activity of those microscopic corpuscles themselves, he did also want to avail himself of the opportunity to explain some other phenomena in terms of the interactions of complex wholes, considered as such. The colour of a billiard ball, for instance, might need to be referred to the motions and rotations of the globules of the second element, in relation to the particles in the surface of the ball itself and in our eyes. But it should be possible to give an adequate explanation of the motion of the ball, when struck by another, simply in terms of the macroscopic mechanical qualities of those balls themselves, construed as complex individuals in their own right.
	And so I would suggest that the crucial sentence of §25 should be read as follows. In cases where several parts of matter are all participating together in a common transference from one neighbourhood to another, this motion should be attributed to the totality of these parts together, even when they are additionally shifting about amongst themselves. That is to say, motion is to be ascribed to the greatest quantity of matter than is being transferred from one (external) place to another, as well as to the least. But, read in this way, the passage is simply remaining silent about cases where we are not dealing with a maximal quantity of matter to which a single common transference can be ascribed, i.e. where we are dealing with something at rest. It does not say that such a quantity of matter is not also to be regarded as an individual body. Admittedly, by remaining silent, it also does not say that it is to be regarded as one: but Descartes’ remarks elsewhere make it clear that it must be. The comment quoted above from his 1645 letter to Clerselier, among many others, suggests that he was content with the notion that there should be corporeal individuals at rest; and his views on the physical efficacy of rest show that he had solid theoretical grounds for taking this line.
	Among the various criticisms that have been levelled at Descartes on the basis of §25, there has been an accusation of circularity. On the face of it, he seems to be defining ‘motion’ in terms of ‘one body’, and then immediately going on to define ‘one body’ in terms of ‘motion’. Garber, for instance, writes: “The most obvious problem derives from the evident circularity of the definition of body.”​[53]​ It seems that individuality must be prior to motion, so that there can be a subject there that is fit for this motion to be ascribed to. But for motion thus to rest on individuality, when individuality is itself being made to rest on motion, will be for both to be left without any real foundation at all. For my part, however, I find no such circularity here, precisely because, although I do read the first sentence of §25 as providing a genuine definition of motion, I do not read its second sentence as offering a definition of individuality or anything else. I simply do not see it as even purporting to offer any necessary conditions, not even when animated bodies are put to one side and the context is limited to a purely physical one. Corporeal individuality is equally applicable to parts of matter at rest as to ones in motion.
	So much for §25: what about other passages, where Descartes might be regarded as suggesting a link between motion and individuality? Given that there are so few, most commentators have made their entire case rest on §25 alone. But Des Chene does add one more, writing: “Descartes’s principle of the dynamic individuation of bodies appears first in Le Monde; it is repeated, without significant alteration, in the Principles” (i.e. in §25, which Des Chene immediately then proceeds to discuss).​[54]​ The passage in question from The World reads:

Note, by the way, that here, and always from here onwards, I shall take a single part to be everything that is joined together and which is not in the process of separating, even though the smallest parts could be divided easily into many smaller ones; thus a grain of sand, a stone, a rock, indeed the whole earth itself, can from here on be taken as a single part, in so far as we are considering here only a completely simple and completely equal motion.​[55]​

Leaving aside Descartes’ well-known change of heart regarding the motion of the earth, Des Chene is perfectly correct to say that Descartes’ position here is effectively the same as the one he presented in the later passage from the Principles. 
	When Descartes says that the body “is not in the process of separating” (n’est point en action pour se separer), he cannot mean that it is not separating itself from its neighbours, which (at least as far as the later definition from the Principles is concerned) would mean precisely that it is not moving. Rather, what he must mean is that its parts are not separating themselves from one another, i.e. it is not disintegrating. The whole is remaining “joined together”, as he also says here. These parts might indeed be rearranging themselves within the whole. Particular rocks and stones and grains of sand, for instance, insofar as these can be construed as parts of “the whole earth itself”, can perfectly well have individual motions of their own without undermining the earth’s integrity; just as, in the Principles, the individual motions of a body’s parts would not automatically undermine the unity of the whole. But such parts will nevertheless be keeping any such activity contained within a continuous outermost boundary. The kind of separation that is getting excluded in this passage is one whereby that overall boundary should be severed in such a way that one portion of matter is rent into two discontinuous pieces. But, understanding a single part of matter to be everything that is not in the process of separating in this sense, it follows that this part as a whole must be separating from its neighbours, i.e. it must be moving as motion would be getting defined in the Principles. If a part of matter was not separating from its neighbours, i.e. if it was remaining joined together with them, then this part would turn out not to be everything that is thus joined together. That honour would instead fall to the larger aggregate of this part plus its surroundings, making that aggregate the ‘single part’ in this case—but only if it is separating from its own surroundings, for otherwise it will not be everything that is joined together either. The account of ‘a single part’ that is offered here is of a part such that, were any more matter to be conceptually packed into it, then its internal parts would turn out to be separating from one another. And thus the condition that Descartes specifies in this passage does indeed turn out to be equivalent to the one he would later be giving. This ‘single part’ must be separating from its neighbours, i.e. moving.
	But there is something else that this passage from The World has in common with the related passage from §25 of Principles II. Just as Descartes wrote “I here understand” in the latter passage, so too does he write “here […] I shall take” in this one. Once again, Descartes seems to be offering an account of corporeal individuality that might be applicable in the present context, but without suggesting that that the same account must be applied in all other contexts too. And what is the present context? On both occasions, these remarks about individuality immediately follow discussions of bodies that are moving. In the light of that, one would naturally think that Descartes is seeking to specify not what it is to be a single body, but rather what it is to be a single moving body, because what he wants to identify is the appropriate subject for this motion to be ascribed to. After all, the latter is a very important issue for Descartes, and for Descartes qua physicist to boot. The bulk of a moving body, along with its speed, is going to factor into the ‘quantity of motion’ involved in the case; and quantity of motion and its (re-)distribution over time are absolutely central to Cartesian physics. Small wonder, then, that Descartes should take care, in cases where there is motion, to make it explicit just which quantity of matter this motion belongs to.
	Admittedly, Descartes does say a little bit more in this passage from The World than he does in the other. The account he presents in this passage is to be applied not only “here”, but “here, and always from here onwards”. But still, must we take that to mean: in every context? Can we not take it simply to mean: on every occasion when this context happens to recur? If one looks at the final clause of this passage, it seems that Descartes must have intended the latter. He tells us—of a grain of sand, a stone, etc.—that any such object “can from here on be taken as a single part, in so far as we are considering here only a completely simple and completely equal motion” (emphasis added). If, in other contexts, ones where we might find ourselves no longer focusing on motions but considering things from other perspectives instead, we might well find that other conceptions of individuality have greater applicability or usefulness.
	So can we find other contexts in The World where Descartes was content to countenance corporeal individuality without motion? Certainly we can, and the paradigm case here is just as it is in the Principles: namely, bodies at rest. Having just criticised the Aristotelians’ treatment of motion, Descartes then proceeded to criticise their treatment of rest: “In addition, the Philosophers attribute to the least of these motions a being much more solid and real than they do to rest, which they say is merely a privation of motion. For my part, I conceive of rest as a quality also, which should be attributed to matter while it remains in one place, just as motion is a quality attributed to matter while it is changing place.”​[56]​ So, again, rest is no mere privation. It is something real in its own right, ontologically on a par with motion, and physically active in opposing it. Immediately prior to the discussion of parts of matter in motion that culminates in the above remark about individuation, we find a discussion of those other parts of matter that are at rest. As a whole, this chapter of The World is concerned with the differences between hard (or solid) and fluid bodies. Descartes ties fluidity to motion in the parts: but, before addressing that case, he examines the nature of hardness; and, just as in the Principles, his explanation is giving in terms of rest. He writes:

And note that if two of these minute parts are touching one another and are not in the process of moving away from each other, then a force, no matter how small, is needed to separate them; for once they are so positioned, they would never be inclined to dispose themselves differently. […] Now I detect no difference at all between hard bodies and fluid bodies except that the parts of the one can be separated from the whole much more easily than those of the other. Thus, to make the hardest body imaginable, I think it would be enough for all the parts to touch each other, with no space remaining between any two and none of them in the process of moving. For what glue or cement can one imagine beyond this with which to hold the one to the other.​[57]​

The resemblance to the discussion of cohesion in the Principles should be clear. But, again, in order for a part to have, through its rest, this power to resist separation from its neighbours, there must be some resting thing to which this power can belong. This resting part must be an individual in its own right. Indeed, it must be a physical individual as well as a metaphysical one, an actual part of matter and not merely a potential part, because it is actually having a physical effect, in resisting attempts to force it to separate from its neighbours. 
	And so my own view is that Descartes’ universe is chock-a-block with individual bodies, intersecting and existing within one another all the way down to indefinite littleness. Extension had been traditionally understood in terms of parts outside parts, but we might usefully add: parts inside parts. When a sculptor contemplates a solid and homogenous block of marble, and considers the indefinite variety of statues that could be carved out of it, I claim that all of these different intersecting figures are already there, defining as many genuinely individual bodies. Or, indeed, when a physicist looks at the world, he finds the same thing. Although he might choose focus his attention on bodies at various different scales, according to his own particular research interests, it remains the case that there are real bodies available for him to study at each and every scale, regardless of whether there is any motion there or not. One physicist might be interested in what the earth as a whole is doing. What I am claiming is that the earth is a whole, notwithstanding Descartes’ suggestion in the Principles that it is not moving. Another might be more interested in individual rocks, and stones, and grains of sand, things that might indeed be moving across the face of the earth. I claim not only that these are actual parts of matter, but also that they already were such prior to such motion, and that they would remain such even if they were to be brought to rest. And then another might be interested in the two halves of the solid iron nail that are working so hard to maintain their state of rest in relation to one another. The very fact that these two halves are physically operative in establishing so tight a cohesive bond means that they too must be regarded as physical individuals in their own right. Or, again, thinking back to the circulating rings of matter from section II above, I argued there that we can only make sense of such circulation by focusing on what the superficial parts are doing individually; and the alleged link between motion and individuality was seeming to interfere with that, at least in the absence of indefinitely small internal moving parts. But, once we give up that link and treat these superficial parts as all being real physical individuals, quite independently of motion, we can then focus on any ones we like (just as long as they are smaller than the whole), reflect on the fact that each is being transferred away from its own immediate neighbour in the surrounding matter, recognise that all of them together are passing by the same surrounding parts in the same order, and thereby get a grip on the nature of the kind of rotation that renders individual motion possible at all.
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